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NEW MEXICO MENS REA DOCTRINES AND
THE UNIFORM CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
THE NEED FOR REVISION
LEO M. ROMERO*

INTRODUCTION

New Mexico courts have had difficulty in dealing with the mens
rea requirement in criminal cases. Lacking a coherent mens rea
concept, the courts seized upon generalizations that obscure sound
analysis, causing confusion and inconsistent holdings.
In an effort to avoid the problems created by this failure to
devise a coherent theory of criminal intent, uniform jury instructions were adopted by the Supreme Court of New Mexico in
1975.' Becalise they attempt to reflect the then existing law,2 the
instructions largely reflect the imprecision of analysis of criminal
intent that has plagued the courts.
It is the purpose of this article to analyze the New Mexico
approach to mens rea issues. It will look at these issues in the context of jury instructions on criminal intent and in the context of
the mens rea defenses. In particular, this article will analyze the
New Mexico decisions attempting to define the mens rea requirement
*Professor of Law, UNM School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable
comments of his colleagues and the assistance of his research assistants, Antonio Silva,
Nancy Hollander and Charlotte Roosen. The insights gained in discussions of these issues in
my Criminal Law class over the past five years were especially helpful in preparing this
article.
1. The Supreme Court of New Mexico adopted Uniform Jury Instructions for Criminal
Cases by Order dated June 24, 1975. The Uniform Jury Instructions were prepared by the
New Mexico Supreme Court Uniform Jury Instructions Criminal Rules Committee. The
Instructions were not complete on that date, and new Instructions have been adopted as
they have been prepared. At present, the Supreme Court of New Mexico has adopted
instructions for most felony offenses in New Mexico.
The new Uniform Jury Instructions are unique in that they are mandatory. The General
Use Note adopted by the Supreme Court of New Mexico provides:
When a Uniform Instruction is provided for the elements of a crime, a
defense or a general explanatory instruction on evidence or trial procedure,
the Uniform Instruction must be used without substantive modification or
substitution. In no event may an elements instruction be altered or an instruction given on a subject which a Use Note directs that no instruction be given.
For any other matter, if the court determines that a Uniform Instruction must
be altered, the reasons for the alteration must be stated in the record.
2. Although there is no statement in the Approved Committee Commentaries or in any
order of the New Mexico Supreme Court that the Uniform Jury Instructions for Criminal
Cases are to reflect the existing New Mexico law, the Approved Committee Commentaries
on every Instruction include the relevant New Mexico cases as support for the Instructions.
New Mexico Jury Instructions Criminal, Approved Committee Commentaries 1975.
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and will evaluate the New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions
for Criminal Cases to assess their adequacy in formulating a
coherent approach to the resolution of these problems. Finally, it
will set forth the Model Penal Code's method of analysis as a solution for the difficulties encountered in the New Mexico approach
to mens rea issues.
THE MENS REA PROBLEM
Criminal liability rests on two basic requirements: proscribed
conduct that includes a voluntary act or omission and a blameworthy state of mind. These requirements are termed actus reus
and mens rea, respectively. Neither is sufficient to establish liability; both must be present.'
The actus reus usually is easily discernible by reference to the
definition of the crime. It consists of three elements: an act, attendant circumstances and, sometimes, a result.' For example, in the
New Mexico Criminal Code murder is defined as the "unlawful killing of one human being by another with malice aforethought, either
express or implied, by any of the means with which death may be
caused." ' The actus reus of murder, therefore, consists of the following elements: (1) an act or omission that may cause death, (2) the
circumstance that the victim be a human being other than the one
who did the act or omitted to do something that caused the death,
and (3) the result of death. Any crime may be similarly dissected to
discover the actus reus elements.
A more difficult task, however, is the formulation of a simple
statement of the requisite of mens rea. It is unnecessary to go into
the history of mens rea or even to explore in detail the juris6
prudence underlying the mens rea requirement. Suffice it to say
that moral blameworthiness is a deeply rooted precondition to the
imposition of penal sanctions. The moral condemnation that is
expressed by guilt and punishment, therefore, requires for the
commission of a crime some mental state that denotes fault or
3. See, e.g., J. Biggs, The Guilty Mind (1955); J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law
chs. III, VI (2d ed. 1960); H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the
Philosophy of Law ch. 11 (1968); W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § § 24-27 (1972); H.
Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction chs. 5, 6 (1968); R. Perkins, Perkins on
Criminal Law 739-44 (2d ed. 1969); G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part § § 1-15
(2d ed. 1961); Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 1043 (1958); Sayre,
Mens Rea, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974 (1932); Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common
Law, 6 Camb. L.J. 31 (1938).
4. See, e.g., R. Perkins, supra note 3, at 547-51; G. Williams, supra note 3, at 16-21.
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-1 (Repl. 1972).
6. For a discussion of the history of both rationales underlying the mens rea concept, see
generally the authorities set forth in note 3 supra.
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culpability. The term mens rea refers to the mental element necessary for the particular crime. 7 In the example of murder, the
requirement of malice aforethought refers to the requisite mental
state, or mens rea, that must accompany the actus reus in order to
establish liability.
The term mens rea refers to the mental state required for commission of a crime but it does not, however, indicate what particular mental state or states is required. It is not easy to ascertain
which state of mind is sufficient to establish criminal liability for
several reasons. First, many statutes are silent with respect to a
mental element. 8 Second, an abundance of mens rea terms are
utilized by the legislatures and the courts. Words such as criminal
intent, 9 general intent,' 0 specific intent,' ' dishonest intent,1 2
feloniously,"
malice,'" willfully,'
deliberate,' 6 wanton,' 7
depraved,'
unlawfully,'
conscious wrongdoing, 2 0 and a host of
others have caused much confusion and obscured meaningful
analysis of the mental element. 2 ' Indeed, courts have admitted
their inability to define satisfactorily many of these terms. 2 2
7. There are two definitions of mens rea One definition uses the term mens rea to
denote the mental state required for commission of a crime. The other definition of mens
rea refers generally to legal responsibility. The latter definition thus includes all of the
qualifications to criminal liability- defenses such as insanity and infancy in addition to the
absence of a required mental state. See S. Kadish & M. Paulsen, Criminal Law and Its
Processes 87-88 (3d ed. 1975); H. Packer, supra note 3, at 105-06. Kadish refers to the first
definiton as mens rea in its "special sense" and the second definition as mens rea in its
"general sense." This article uses mens rea in its special
sense.
8. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); State v. Shedoudy, 45
N.M. 516, 118 P.2d 280 (1941). The larceny statute in New Mexico is an example of a
statute that includes no reference to a required mental state. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-16-1
(Repl. 1972).
9. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 70 N.M. 176, 372 P.2d 128 (1962); State v. Shedoudy, 45
N.M. 516, 118 P.2d 280 (1941).
10. See, e.g., State v. Austin, 80 N.M. 748, 461 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1969).
11. See, e.g., State v. Grayson, 50 N.M. 147, 172 P.2d 1019 (1946);State v. Dosier, 88
N.M. 32, 536 P.2d 1088 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 28, 536 P.2d 1084 (1975).
12. Territory v. Graves, 17 N.M. 241, 125 P. 604 (1912).
13. State v. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. 516, 118 P.2d 280 (1941).
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-1 (Repl. 1972); State v. Anderson, 40 N.M. 173, 56 P.2d
1134 (1936).
15. State v. Anderson, 40 N.M. 173, 56 P.2d 1134 (1936).
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-1 (Repl. 1972).
17. Statev. Clarkson, 58 N.M. 56, 265 P.2d 670 (1954).
18. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-1 (Repl. 1972).
19. State v. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. 516, 118 P.2d 280 (1941).
20. State v. Bachicha, 84 N.M. 397, 503 P.2d 1175 (Ct. App. 1972); State v. Austin, 80
N.M. 748, 461 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1969).
21. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 193-94.
22. See, e.g., People v. Hood, I Cal. 3d 444, 456, 462 P.2d 370, 377, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618,
625 (1969); State v. Lopez, 84 N.M. 453, 454, 504 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Ct. App. 1972)
(Sutin, J., dissenting).
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The difficulty in ascertaining the mental element of a criminal
offense is due in part to a third reason-the variety of conduct
with which a criminal code deals. There is no single mens rea for
all crimes. Different crimes often have different mens rea requirements. 2 3 For example, a homicide may be murder in the first
degree or involuntary manslaughter depending upon the mental
state that accompanied the act of killing. If the actus reus for a
homicide was done with a willful, deliberate, and premeditated
2 4 If, however, the
state of mind, it is murder in the first degree.
killing was reckless with respect to the result of death, it is involuntary manslaughter. 2 s Thus, murder and manslaughter each
have a different mens rea although both rest upon the same actus
reus.2 6 This difference in mens rea also exists for crimes that do
not share the same actus reus elements.
A fourth reason underlying the difficulty of determining the
mens rea requirement for a particular crime is the fact that the
state of mind accompanying the actus reus may vary among the
different elements of a single crime. 2 Given a charge of unlawful
taking of a vehicle, 2 8 for example, the prosecution normally must
prove that the taking was intentional. Other circumstances also are
essential to establish commission of the crime. The object of the
taking must be a vehicle and the taking must be without the
consent of the owner. These elements may be accompanied by
different mental states. The defendant may know that he does not
have the consent of the owner or he may be reckless or negligent
in believing that he has the owner's consent. The same range of
possible mental states exists for each element of the offense.
The mens rea problem is thus the ascertainment of the mental
state or states that will suffice to establish criminal liability. In
other words, what combinations of possible mental states will
satisfy the mens rea requirement for a particular offense.
THE NEW MEXICO APPROACH TO THE MENS REA PROBLEM

The New Mexico approach to the mens rea problem is premised
on common law principles. As a general rule, "a crime isn't com23. J. Hall, supra note 3, at 103.
24. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-1(A)(1) (Repl. 1972).
25. A reckless killing would be a homicide committed "without due caution and
circumspection" in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-3(B) (Repl. 1972).
26. The actus reus for each crime includes the killing of one human being by another.
27. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 194-95; H. Packer, supra note 3, at 104-05.
28. The New Mexico statute defines this crime as follows: "Any person who shall take
any vehicle or motor vehicle intentionally and without consent of the owner thereof shall be
guilty of a felony." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-9-4(a) (Supp. 1975).
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mitted if the mind of the person doing the unlawful act is innocent," 2"9 The commission of a crime requires a guilty mind or,

in the terms of the New Mexico courts, criminal intent.3 0
Although the legislature is vested with the authority to define
crimes, statutory provisions rarely specify the mental elements
required for the commission of a crime. 3" The courts have been
left with two tasks in defining the requisite mental state for
particular crimes: Did the legislature intend to dispense with a
guilty-mind requirement and, if not, what mental element or

elements satisfy the guilty-mind requirement?
The determination of whether a crime requires criminal intent is

a matter of statutory construction.3 2 The courts construe a crime

to impose strict liability only when the legislature clearly and
unambiguously intends to impose liability without respect to fault

or blameworthiness. 3" Crimes that omit any reference to a mental
element have been construed to require criminal intent where the

legislative intent is unclear.3 4 Thus, the courts have construed
most criminal statutes in New Mexico to require criminal intent.
Only certain regulatory offenses have been interpreted as dispensing with criminal intent and imposing strict liability.3 5
In determining that most crimes require mens rea, the New
29. State v. Blacklock, 23 N.M. 251, 254, 167 P. 714, 715 (1917).
30. See, e.g., State v. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. 516, 118 P.2d 280 (1941).
31. Statutes are either silent regarding any mental element or ambiguous in view of the
variety of mens rea terms used. See notes 9-21 supra and accompanying text.
32. In State v. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. 516, 524, 118 P.2d 280, 286 (1941), the Supreme
Court of New Mexico stated, "[W] hether a criminal intent is to be regarded as essential, is a
matter of construction, to be determined from a consideration of the matters prohibited,
and the language of the statute, in the light of the common law rule."
33. Id at 524, 118 P.2d at 286. However, the New Mexico Court of Appeals recently
stated a view of strict liability that includes at least one type of fault. In State v. Lucero, 87
N.M. 242, 531 P.2d 1215 (Ct. App. 1975) the violation of a statute that included negligence
as a basis of criminal liability was said to be an example of a strict liability crime. Id at 244,
531 P.2d at 1217. This view of strict liability is not consistent with the usual definition of
strict liability without any fault. See, e.g., W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 218; H.
Packer, supra note 3, at 127-29, H. L. A. Hart, supra note 3, at 149-152. Negligence is
generally viewed as a type of fault, although there is disagreement as to whether negligence
ought to serve as the basis for the imposition of the criminal sanction. See, e.g., J. Hall,
supra note 3, at 133-141; G. Williams, supra note 3, at 122-24; H. Packer, supra note 3, at
127-29; H. L. A. Hart, supra note 3, at 136-157; Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the
Criminal Law, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 731, 741-45 (1960).
34. See, e.g., the statute construed in State v. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. 516, 118 P.2d 280
(1941).
35. See, e.g., State v. Alva, 18 N.M. 143, 134 P. 209 (1913); Territory v. Church, 14
N.M. 226, 91 P. 720 (1907); State v. Vickery, 85 N.M. 389, 512 P.2d 962 (Ct. App.) cert.
denied, 85 N.M. 380, 512 P.2d 953 (1973); State v. Dennis, 80 N.M. 262, 454 P.2d 276 (Ct.
App. 1969). But see State v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 531 P.2d 1215 (Ct. App.) cert. denied,
87 N.M. 239, 531 P.2d 1212 (1975), where a statute was construed to impose strict liability
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Mexico courts have used the term criminal intent.3 6 Although the
term suggests an intentional state of mind, criminal intent may also
include a knowing' ' and perhaps even a reckless or negligent
frame of mind.' ' Apparently recognizing that the term criminal
intent means more than intent and, in effect, signifies the requirement of a guilty mind, the New Mexico courts settled on "conscious wrongdoing" as the definition of criminal intent.3 9 This definition, however, provides little guidance as to the state of mind that
satisfies the guilty mind requirement. Conscious wrongdoing may
suggest a knowing state of mind, but the definition is ambiguous.
Does it also suggest an intentional, reckless, or negligent state of
mind?
The use of a single term like criminal intent, however defined,
to denote the requirement of a guilty mind is inadequate in view
of the possible different states of mine which may accompany the
different elements of a crime. The use of a single mens rea term raises
several important questions. Does the term apply to all elements of
the offense or only to some of them? 4" Does the term include
recklessness or negligence as a basis of culpability?4 1 The use of a
single mens rea, such as criminal intent or conscious wrongdoing,
thus obscures the problem of determining what mental states must
accompany each element of the actus rea. The assumption that
although the statutory language included the terms "knowingly, intentionally, or
negligently."
Crimes that are construed to impose strict liability often still require some culpability.
Strict liability usually refers only to the mental state that must accompany one element of
the offense. With respect to the other elements, some culpable state of mind is required. See
H. Packer, supra note 3, at 126.
36. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 70 N.M. 176, 372 P.2d 128 (1962); State v. Shedoudy, 45
N.M. 516, 118 P.2d 280 (1941); State v. Mascarenas, 86 N.M. 692, 526 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App.
1974); State v. Montoya, 86 N.M. 155, 520 P.2d 1100 (Ct. App. 1974); State v. Fuentes, 85
N.M. 274, 511 P.2d 760 (Ct. App.) cert. denied, 85 N.M. 265, 511 P.2d 751 (1973); State v.
Bachicha, 84 N.M. 397, 503 P.2d 1175 (Ct. App. 1972); State v. Lopez, 84 N.M. 453, 504
P.2d 1086 (Ct. App. 1972); State v. Austin, 80 N.M. 748, 461 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1969).
37. In State v. Craig, 70 N.M. 176, 372 P.2d 128 (1962), the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that the failure to instruct that a knowing state of mind was required for
conviction was error in view of the court's conclusion that the statute requires criminal
intent.
. 38. Some jurisdictions include these states of mind within the term criminal intent. See,
e.g, W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 194. The New Mexico Court of Appeals,
however, apparently does not include negligence within the doctrine of criminal intent;
instead, a crime of negligence is viewed as a strict liability crime. State v. Lucero, 87 N.M.
242, 531 P.2d 1215 (Ct. App. 1975).
39. This term was first used in State v. Austin, 80 N.M. 748, 461 P.2d 230 (Ct. App.
1969). Subsequent cases through 1975 continued to use this definition of criminal intent.
See, e.g., State v. Mascarenas, 86 N.M. 692, 526 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1974): State v.
Bachicha, 84 N.M. 397, 503 P.2d 1175 (Ct. App. 1972).
40. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 194.
41. Some jurisdiction include these states of mind within the term criminal intent. See
Id. at 201.
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each crime requires but a single mens rea prevents meaningful
analysis of mens rea issues.
The General Intent-Specific Intent Distinction
For those criminal offenses that require criminal intent, New
Mexico, like many jurisdictions, makes a distinction between
crimes of general intent and crimes of specific intent. Historically,
the distinction between specific and general intent evolved as a
limitation to use of intoxication as a defense.4 2 Intoxication was
not allowed to negate a general intent, but it could be used to
negate a specific intent. This limitation persists in New Mexico and
will be examined later.
New Mexico courts,4" and courts in other jurisdictions,4 4 have
had some difficulty in defining and distinguishing general and
specific intent. General intent has been used synonymously with
criminal intent.4" General intent refers to the mental state with
which the act or actus reus is done. 4 6 Crimes of specific intent
42. Regina v. Monkhouse, 4 Cox Crim. Cas. 55 (1849). See also I. J. Bishop, Bishop on
Criminal Law 299 (9th ed. 1923); Hall, Intoxication and CriminalResponsibility, 57 Harv.
L. Rev. 1045 (1944).
43. Seee.g., State v. Gunzelman, 84 N.M. 451, 504 P.2d 1084 (Ct. App. 1972) (Sutin, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 85 N.M. 295, 512 P.2d 55 (1973); State v. Gonzales, 86 N.M. 556, 525
P.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1974), overruled in State v. Bender, 91 N.M. 670, 579 P.2d 796 (1978);
State v. Montoya, 86 N.M. 155, 520 P.2d 1100 (Ct. App. 1974); State v. Tucker, 86 N.M.
553, 525 P.2d 913 (Ct. App.) cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525 P.2d 888 (1974); State v.
Fuentes, 85 N.M. 274, 511 P.2d 760 (Ct. App.) cert. denied, 85 N.M. 265, 511 P.2d 751
(1973); State v. Lopez, 84 N.M. 453, 504 P.2d 1086 (Ct. App. 1972); State v. Ramirez, 84
N.M. 166, 500 P.2d 451 (Ct. App.) (Sutin, J., concurring) cert. denied, 84 N.M. 180, 500
P.2d 1303 (1972); State v. Viscarra, 84 N.M. 217, 501 P.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1972).
See Thompson & Gagne, The Confusing Law of CriminalIntent in New Mexico, 5 N.M.L.
Rev. 63, 64 (1974), for an account of the confusion and frustration expressed by some of
the appellate judges in defining and distinguishing general and specific intent.
44. See, e.g.. the opinion of Justice Traynor in People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d
370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969). Justice Traynor acknowledged that general and specific
intent have been notoriously difficult terms to define and that the difference between them
is often only linguistic. Id. at 456, 462 P.2d at 377-78, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26.
45. See, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 84 N.M. 166, 500 P.2d 451 (Ct. App.) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 180, 500 P.2d 1303 (1972); State v. Viscarra, 84 N.M. 217,
501 P.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1972). See also W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 201.
46. The Supreme Court of New Mexico in State v. Bender, 91 N.M. 670, 579 P.2d 796
(1978), adopted Justice Taynor's definition of general and specific intent in People v. Hood,
1 Cal. 3d 444, 456, 462 P.2d 370, 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 626 (1969):
When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular
act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a further
consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act.
This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition
refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional
consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.
See also W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 201-02; R. Perkins, supra note 3, at 744-45,
750-51.
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require something more-a particular mental state in addition to
the state of mind that accompanies the act. This additional mental
state often involves an intent to do a further act or to achieve a
further consequence. For example, one may enter a building with
intent to enter and with knowledge of nonconsent. But such an
entry is not a burglary unless it is accompanied by the intent to
steal or to commit a felony in the building. This additional intent
to steal or commit a felony is termed a specific intent and is an
essential requirement of the crime of burglary. Without the intent
to steal, the crime is criminal trespass, a general intent crime,
because the intent to enter and the knowledge of nonconsent refer
only to the actus reus elements of the crime. The following
diagrams illustrate the difference between a crime of general intent
and one of specific intent.
Criminal Trespass
Actus Reus
1. Entry ......................
2. Building ...................
3. Without consent ..............

Mens Rea
Purposely
Knowlingly
Knowingly

Criminal Trespass is a crime of general intent because the states of
mind refer to the different elements of the actus reus.
Burglary
Actus Reus
1. Entry .........................
2. Building ......................
3. Without consent ...............

Mens Rea
Purposely
Knowingly
Knowingly
With intent to steal or
commit a felony therein

Burglary is a crime of specific intent because the fourth element,
with intent to steal or commit a felony, is a mental state required in
addition to the states of mind that must accompany the actus reus.
Whether a crime requires a specific intent is largely a matter of
statutory formulation. If by definition the offense requires an intent
beyond the mental states accompanying the actus reus, it is a specific
intent crime. If the legislative definition does not include an additional intent, the crime requires only a general or criminal intent.
Although the distinction between general and specific intent seems
simple enough, the use of the term intent in both phrases has caused
the courts some difficulty. In three 1974 cases concerning the Con-
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trolled Substances Act, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that
specific intent is an element of the crime of distributing a controlled
substance or possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute.4'7 The court failed to distinguish between the two ways in
which the statute may be violated. Intentionally distributing does
not require any additional intent beyond the state of mind required
to accompany the actus reus. The Supreme Court of New Mexico, in
a 1978 case, correctly analyzed this section of the statute as a general
intent crime and overruled the earlier cases which held that it defined
a specific intent crime. 4 8 The second part of the statute, however,
requires an additional intent. It requires that possession-intentional
possession or knowing possession-be accompanied by the additional
intent to distribute. An intent to use or to destroy would not satisfy
this part of the statute even though the defendant possessed the
controlled substances intentionally and knowingly.
The general-specific intent dichotomy is significant in New Mexico
only insofar as several defenses are limited to crimes of specific
intent.4 The application of the defense of intoxication to the above
provisions of the Controlled Substances Act illustrates the significance of this distinction. Intoxication that precludes the intent to
distribute is a defense to the part of the statute that prohibits possession with intent to distribute because this part of the statute
requires a specific intent. Intoxication that has the effect of negating
the same intent is not a defense, however, to the part of the statute
that proscribes intentional distribution because this part requires a
general intent only. Apart from the concern for whether the intoxication defense should be premised on the general-specific intent
distinction, the application of the distinction artificially draws a line
between two crimes that include the same mental state. The only
difference between the intents to distribute in each crime is formal
rather than substantive, and such a formal difference should not be a
premise upon which legal consequences turn.
JurisdictionalProblem
Much of the problem in New Mexico in defining criminal intent
stems from the fact that most mens rea issues have been presented in
47. State v. Montoya, 86 N.M. 155, 520 P.2d 1100 (Ct. App. 1974); State v. Tucker, 86
N.M. 553, 525 P.2d 913 (Ct. App), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525 P.2d 888 (1974); State v.
Gonzales, 86 N.M. 556, 525 P.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1974), overruled in State v. Bender, 91
N.M. 670, 579 P.2d 796 (1978).
48. State v. Bender, 91 N.M. 670, 579 P.2d 796 (1978).
49. Intoxication and mental disease or disorder. See note 89 and accompanying text
infra for a discussion of the intoxication defense. The defense of mental disease or disorder
is discussed infra at note 145.
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the context of jurisdictional error. Questions of jurisdiction may be
raised on appeal for the first time even if no objection was made at
trial.' 0 New Mexico courts have held that failure to instruct the jury
on every essential element of a crime is a jurisdictional error.' 1 Since
criminal intent is an essential element in every crime in New Mexico
with the exception of strict liability crimes, 2 many cases have held
that failure to instruct on criminal intent is a jurisdictional error that
may be raised for the first time on appeal.5 I
Jurisdictional error for failure to instruct on criminal intent has
proved bothersome to the New Mexico courts for several reasons.
The major problem lay in developing a standard against which to
measure the adequacy of the instruction given by the trial court. In
developing a standard, the appellate courts had to determine first
what types of criminal intent the particular offense required (specific
or general intent) and then define the requisite intent. The standard
finally adopted was that an instruction would be sufficient and
would therefore avoid jurisdictional error if it either defined "criminal intent in terms of 'conscious wrongdoing' or its equivalent," or
defined the criminal offense "in terms of the statute if it [the
statute] defines the requisite intent." '
The effect of this standard was to generate litigation questioning
whether the statutory definition of particular crimes sufficiently
defined the requisite intent. The jurisdictional posture in which
many mens rea issues were litigated did not assist the New Mexico
courts in defining what mental elements are required for commission
of any crime. When raised on appeal as a jurisdictional matter, the
mens rea issue was decided in the abstract and without reference to
any elements of the offense charged. The defendant did not raise a
mens rea defense at trial because no mens rea instruction was requested. For the appellate courts to decide in this posture what
instruction on criminal intent was necessary in order to avoid a
50. See State v. Ferguson, 56 N.M. 398, 244 P.2d 783 (1952); State v. Walsh, 81 N.M.
65, 67, 463 P.2d 41, 43 (Ct. App. 1969); State v. Austin, 80 N.M. 748, 749, 461 P.2d 230,
231 (Ct. App. 1969), and the authorities cited therein. See also Rule 308 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure for Criminal Cases, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-23A-308 (Supp. 1975).
51. See DesGeorges v. Grainger, 76 N.M. 52, 412 P.2d 6 (1966), for the types of issues
that may be raised for the first time on appeal.
52. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., State v. Gunzelman, 84 N.M. 451, 504 P.2d 1084 (Ct. App. 1973), Rev'd,
85 N.M. 295, 512 P.2d 55 (1973); State v. Fuentes, 85 N.M. 274, 511 P.2d 760 (1973);
State v. Ferguson, 56 N.M. 398, 244 P.2d 783 (1972); State v. Foster, 87 N.M. 155, 530
P.2d 949 (Ct. App. 1974); State v. Lopez, 84 N.M. 453, 504 P.2d 1086 (Ct. App. 1973);
State v. Puga, 85 N.M. 204, 510 P.2d 1075 (Ct. App. 1973); State v. Bachicha, 84 N.M. 397,
503 P.2d 117 (Ct. App. 1972).
54. State v. Gunzelman, 85 N.M. 295, 512 P.2d 55 (1973); State v. Montoya, 86 N.M.
155, 156-57, 520 P.2d 1100, 1101 (Ct. App. 1974).
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reversal is to decide an important question out of context. The result
has been the development of a mens rea doctrine that assumes that
a single mental element, such as "conscious wrongdoing," applies to
every crime and that fails to recognize that each element of an offense may be accompanied by a different state of mind.
This litigation brought forth calls for uniform jury instructions on
intent in the hope that they would prevent appeals based on jurisdictional error.' I Yet an instruction in the language of the statute
should be sufficient to avoid jurisdictional error, even if the statute is
silent with respect to the mental element.' 6 Any additional instruction on the required mental state should not be a jurisdictional
matter but an issue that must be raised at trial by submission of a
requested instruction.' ' The variety of ways in which a mens rea
defense may arise suggests that no single broad definition of criminal
intent will adequately inform the jury of the essential mental
elements that.the particular defendant denies. It is better to evaluate
the adequacy of the jury instruction on mens rea in the context of a
record where the mens rea issues were raised by objection or by
requested instructions.
The Uniform Jury Instruction on General Criminal Intent
The New Mexico Supreme Court adopted Uniform Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases in 1975.s8 The uniform instructions are
mandatory and not subject to modification.5 9 Instruction 1.50 concerns general criminal intent and provides that
In addition to the other elements of

the State

must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant acted intentionally when he committed the crime. A
55. See the opinions of Judge Sutin in State v. Dosier, 88 N.M. 32, 37, 536 P.2d 1088,
1093 (Ct. App. 1975) (concurring opinion), State v. Fuentes, 85 N.M. 274, 277, 511 P.2d
760, 761 (Ct. App. 1973) (concurring opinion), and State v. Lopez, 84 N.M. 453, 454, 504
P.2d 1086, 1087 (Ct. App. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
The New Mexico Supreme Court Jury Instructions Criminal Rules Committee also felt
that uniform jury instructions would "substantially remedy much of the confusion in at
least the practical applications of criminal intent in New Mexico." Thompson & Gagne, The
Confusing Law of CriminalIntent in New Mexico, supra note 43, at 65 n. 16.
56. This view was expressed by Judge Sutin in State v. Lopez, 84 N.M. 453, 454, 504
P.2d 1086, 1087 (Ct. App. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
57. Id See also N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-23A-308 (Supp. 1975).
58. By order of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, the Instructions became effective
September 1, 1975. See also note 1 supra.
The New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions Criminal are contained in N.M. Stat. Ann.
following § 41-23-57 (Supp. 1975) and New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions Criminal
(1975).
59. See note 1 supra for the General Use Note that applies to the New Mexico Uniform
Jury Instructions Criminal.
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person acts intentionally when he purposely does an act which the
law declares to be a crime, even though he may not know that his
act is unlawful. Whether the defendant acted intentionally may be
inferred from all of the surrounding circumstances, such as the
manner in which he acts, the means used, [and] his conduct, [and]
any statements made by him. (Brackets in the original)
The Use Note following this instruction provides that it must be used
with every crime except for "(1) the relatively few crimes not requiring criminal intent, and (2) first and second degree murder and
voluntary manslaughter."
Instruction 1.50 and its Use Note changed the existing law in
several respects. First, it must be given even if the language of the
statute includes the requisite intent.6 0 Previously, a separate instruction on criminal intent was not required if the jury was instructed in
the terms of the statute and those terms included the requisite
intent.6 1 The second change from the prior case law involves the use
of instruction 1.50 in crimes of specific intent. In cases decided prior
to the adoption of the Uniform Jury Instructions, an instruction on
general criminal intent was unnecessary if the jury was correctly
instructed as to the requisite specific intent.6 2 Third, the uniform
instruction sets forth a new definition of criminal intent, replacing
6
the "conscious wrongdoing" definition. 3
The first two changes solved the jurisdictional error problem that
previously beset the New Mexico appellate courts.6
Appeals predicated on jurisdictional error due to the failure to instruct the jury
correctly as to the required mental state are now foreclosed, at least
for those crimes requiring only a general criminal intent, because
instruction 1.50 must be given for every crime that includes criminal
6 5
intent as an essential element.
Unfortunately, the change in the definition of criminal intent in
the uniform instruction does not eliminate the confusion and
ambiguity in the earlier formulations of the mens rea requirement.
The new definition, like earlier ones, provides inadequate guidance as
to the mental state or states that satisfy the guilty mind requirement.
60. Use Note for N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 1.50.
61. State v. Gonzales, 86 N.M. 556, 557, 525 P.2d 916, 917 (1974); State v. Gunzelman,
85 N.M. 295, 301, 512 P.2d 55, 61 (1973); State v. Dosier, 88 N.M. 32, 36, 536 P.2d 1088,
1092 (Ct. App. 1975).
62. Id
63. See cases cited in note 39 supra.
64. See note 50 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the jurisdictional error
problem.
65. Jurisdictional error may still arise with respect to specific intent crimes. Failure to
instruct the jury as to the requisite specific intent would not be cured by N.M. U.J.1. Crim.
1.50.
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Instruction 1.50 defines criminal intent as "purposely doing an act
which the law declares to be a crime." This definition is ambiguous
in that it does not state what an "act" is.' 6 Does "act" include all of
the actus reus elements of a crime6 7 or does it mean only a bodily
movement? 6 8 If "act" includes all of the elements of a crime, this
definition of criminal intent would require that the defendant act
intentionally with respect to every element of the crime. Take, for
example, the three elements of the crime of unlawful taking of a
motor vehicle: (1) taking, (2) of a vehicle, (3) without the owner's
consent. 6 9 If a purposeful state of mind is required for each of the
elements of this crime, a conviction is precluded where the defendant's mental state with respect to the owner's consent is either
reckless or negligent.
This construction of "act" assumes that one state of mind is
involved in conduct that embraces the various elements of a crime.
This assumption ignores the fact that a person may have different
states of mind with respect to the different elements of a crime. 70 A
person may purposely take a vehicle, but he may be reckless, negligent, or even reasonable regarding his belief that he had the owner's
consent.
The requirement of a purposeful state of mind for every element
of a crime, as this construction of instruction 1.50 prescribes,
is inconsistent with the mistake instruction in instruction 41.15,
which makes a mistake of fact a defense only if the mistake is reasonable. Any mistake, reasonable or unreasonable, would logically
negate the purposeful state of mind required by 1.50. Suppose, for
example, that a defendant purposely takes a vehicle believing that he
has the owner's consent because the vehicle was unlocked and the
keys were in the ignition. If a jury were to find that the defendant
honestly but unreasonably believed that he had the owner's consent,
there would be no criminal intent because the defendant did not act
66. The word "act" itself is ambiguous. It is often used to denote different degrees of
generality. R. Perkins, supra note 3, at 547, offers the following example of the degrees of
generality that have been attached to the word: "If death has resulted from a pistol shot,
shall the act be said to be (1) killing, (2) impinging the bullet upon the body of the victim,
(3) shooting, (4) pulling the trigger, or (5) crooking the finger?"
67. J. Salmond, On Jurisprudence 503 (9th ed. 1937); G. Williams, supra note 3, at § 11.
The definition of "act" includes (1) a willed movement (or omission), (2) certain surrounding circumstances, and (3) certain consequences. Id.
68. 0. Holmes, The Common Law 54 (1881); Model Penal Code § 1.13(2) (Prop.
Official Draft 1962).
69. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-9-4 (Repl. 1964).
70. This construction, on the other hand, may assume that any mental state other than
intent is an insufficient basis for criminal liability. This assumption conflicts, however, with
the reasonableness requirement for mistakes of fact in N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 41.15.
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purposely with respect to every element. Since criminal intent is
required for commission of the crime, this unreasonable mistake
would provide a defense under this interpretation of instruction
1.50. However, instruction 41.15 would preclude this defense because the mistake was unreasonable. Actually, the mistake of fact
instruction suggests that negligence is a sufficient mens rea for every
element of a crime because an unreasonable mistake is, in essence, a
negligent mistake. Under the supposed facts stated above, the
defendant would be acting negligently, rather than intentionally,
with respect to the owner's consent. Thus, the two instructions, 1.50
and 41.15, set forth completely different and inconsistent mens rea
requirements. There is no way to accommodate these instructions as
presently drafted.
The other interpretation of "act" in instruction 1.50 offers no
better guidance as to the mental states required for commission of a
crime. If "act" is construed to encompass only the action element of
the actus reus and not the attendant circumstances or results, instruction 1.50 then offers absolutely no guidance as to the remaining
elements of the crime. Using the earlier example, this reading would
require that the defendant purposely take a vehicle; but it would say
nothing about what state of mind would suffice for the elements of
the owner's nonconsent. This interpretation of instruction 1.50,
read together with the mistake instruction in 41.15, would result in a
negligent mens rea for all elements of a crime except for the action
element. Thus, in our example, an unreasonable mistake as to the
owner's nonconsent would not be a defense, and this would be inconsistent with this interpretation of instruction 1.50. This interpretation of criminal intent would in effect place the definition of
the requisite mens rea for crime generally in the instruction
addressed to the mistake of fact defense. In essence, criminal intent
would mean negligence.
Neither interpretation of instruction 1.50 is very helpful in
determining which mental states ought to be required for commission of a crime. Except for solving the jurisdictional error problem,7 1 the Uniform Jury Instruction on criminal intent suffers from
the same problems of confusion and ambiguity that existed under
the earlier formulations. The expectation that a uniform instruction
on criminal intent would avoid confusion 2 was, unfortunately,
unrealistic under the existing mens rea doctrine in New Mexico. In
71. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 1.50 solves the jurisdictional error problem only for general intent
crimes. It does not deal with specific intent crimes.
72. The committee that drafted the New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions Criminal
believed that they would "substantially remedy much of the confusion in at least the
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fairness to the drafters of the Uniform Jury Instruction, they were
constrained by the existing law. Notwithstanding the new definition
of criminal intent, the instructions were intended to reflect existing
doctrine7" in terms that are understandable to juries. The problem
with instruction 1.50 lies, however, not in its new definition of
criminal intent, in its reflection of existing law on criminal intent,
nor in its phrasing for a jury. Rather, the problem lies in the shortcomings of the law of intent that the instruction reflects.
THE MODEL PENAL CODE'S APPROACH TO THE MENS REA PROBLEM

The solution to the confusion and ambiguity in the mens rea
concept in New Mexico should be addressed not by jury instructions
but by the legislature . 7 4 An approach similar to that set forth in the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code is needed. This approach
recognizes that in order to analyze clearly the mens rea requirements
for criminal liability, the question of the kind of culpability essential
to establish the commission of an offense must be faced separately
with respect to each material element of the crime.' s Section
2.02(1) of the Model Penal Code, for example, provides that a "person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly,
recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each
material element of the offense." 7"6 The Model Penal Code thus
acknowledges that each element of the actus reus is accompanied by
some mental state and that the requisite mental state may differ
from element to element.
The Model Penal Code also provides guidance in resolving the
problem of which mental state is required for each element of the
actus reus. If a criminal statute is silent with respect to a mens rea
requirement, section 2.0(3) provides that acting purposely, knowingly, or recklessly will suffice for each material element of the
offense. 7 However, if the definition of a crime uses a particular
mental state, without indicating to which element or elements it
practical applications of criminal intent in New Mexico." Thompson & Gagne, The
Confusing Law of Criminal Intent in New Mexico, supra note 43, at 65 n. 16. There were
reservations, however, that uniform jury instructions on intent would end the confusion and
controversy surrounding mens rea issues. Id at 89 n. 195.
73. See note 2 supra.
74. Remington & Helstad, The Mental Element in Crime-A Legislative Problem, 1952
Wis. L. Rev. 644.
75. Comments on Model Penal Code § 2.02 (Tent. Draft 3, 1955).
76. Model Penal Code § 2.02(1) (Prop. Official Draft 1962). This approach has been
recognized as one of the Code's most important contributions. See, e.g., G. Williams, supra
note 3, at 52; H. Packer, supra note 3, at 105-06.
77. Id. at § 2.02(3).
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refers, section 2.02(4) provides that the specified mental state shall
be applicable to all of the elements of the offense, unless a contrary
purpose plainly appears. 7 8 By these rules of statutory construction,
the Model Penal Code attempts to resolve the confusion and ambiguity in penal legislation which results from statutes that are drafted
with little or no consideration of the mens rea component.
Another virtue of the Model Penal Code approach is the use of
only four states of mind for the mens rea requirement; purposeful,
knowing, reckless, and negligent. Each kind of culpability is clearly
defined so as to make possible meaningful distinctions among them
in terms of relative culpability. 7 9 Thus, the vagueness of terms such
as general criminal intent, maliciously, scienter, wilfully, feloniously,
and conscious wrongdoing are avoided.
The value of the Model Penal Code can be best illustrated by
applying its terms to the example we used earlier-the unlawful
78. Id. at § 2.02(4).
79. Purposely, knowingly, recklessly and negligently are defined as follows:
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or
to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware
of the existence of such circumstance or he believes or hopes that they
exist.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendent
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that
such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it
is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor's situation.
(d) Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the
nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him,
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor's situation.
Id. at § 2.02(2).
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taking of a motor vehicle. In New Mexico, this crime is defined as
follows: "Any person who shall take any vehicle intentionally and
without consent of the owner thereof shall be guilty of a felony."" 0
The Model Penal Code would preclude conviction unless a defendant
acted with one of the four types of culpability with respect to each
of the three elements of the offense-(1) taking, (2) of a vehicle, and
(3) without consent of the owner. The statute defining the offense
uses the word "intentionally." Assuming that "intentional" means
"purposeful" as defined by the Model Penal Code, to which element
or elements of the offense does "purposeful" refer? Several interpretations are possible. First, purposeful could be read, because of its
placement in the sentence, as referring only to the first two
elements-(l) taking (2) of a vehicle. Under this interpretation, we
are still left with the question of what type of culpability is required
for the third element-(3) without the owner's consent. The Model
Penal Code would answer this question by requiring either a purposeful, knowing, or reckless state of mind for this element. 8 Thus,
if a defendant knew that he did not have the consent of the owner
and therefore acting knowingly, or was aware of the risk of nonconsent but disregarded the risk, therefore acting recklessly, he would
have acted with the requisite culpability with respect to that
element.
The second interpreation yields a different result. Purposeful
could be read as not applying to any element in particular. Then the
Model Penal Code would require a purposeful state of mind for each
element of the offense."2 Under this interpreation, a defendant
could be convicted only if he (1) purposely took, (2) what he
knew8 3 to be a vehicle, (3) knowing 4 that he did not have the
consent of the owner. Acting recklessly, with awareness of the risk,
with respect to the element of the owner's nonconsent, therefore,
would not suffice to establish criminal liability.
The Model Penal Code provides an analytical framework within
which one can determine what mental states will satisfy the mens rea
requirement for a particular crime. In summary, this framework
recognizes (1) a clearly defined terminology for the distinct possible
states of mind, (2) that each element of the actus reus is accom80. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-9-4 (Repl. 1964).
81. Model Penal Code § 2.02(3) (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
82. Id at § 2.02(4).
83. According to the Model Penal Code, a person acts purposely with respect to
attendant circumstances if "he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes
or hopes that they exist." Id. at § 2.02(2)(a)(ii). The requirement that the object taken be a
vehicle is an attendant circumstance of the crime.
84. Id The element of nonconsent is an attendant circumstance.

144
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panied by some mental state, (3) that the requisite mental state may
differ from element to element, and (4) that certain rules of construction are necessary-to assist the courts in determining what states
of mind are sufficient for each element of the actus reus when the
statute does not specify the requisite mental state for every element
of the crime.
The Model Penal Code's provisions on mens rea have had considerable influence on criminal law reform."5 The proposed Federal
Criminal Code,8 6 for example, follows the mens rea approach of the
Model Penal Code. Adoption of the Model Penal Code's framework
would alleviate in large measure the present difficulties in dealing
with mens rea problems in New Mexico.
THE MENS REA DEFENSES

A mens rea defense denies that the defendant possessed a required
mental element. Basically, there are two claims that logically negate
an essential state of mind. The first argues that the defendant was
unable to form the state of mind required to convict him of committing the crime. This inability may be the result of intoxication,
mental disease, or defect.8 7 The second charges that a mistake
produced a state of mind inconsistent with the mental state required
for commission of the offense. 8" This claim may be viewed as
another aspect of incapacity to form a requisite intent, that is, by
misapprehension of certain facts, but mistake is more properly
viewed as a circumstance that produces a state of mind rather than a
circumstance that impairs the formation of a particular mental state.
These two types of mens rea defenses have been recognized in
New Mexico, although they have been circumscribed in large
measure. These defenses will be set forth below as they were defined
first by the New Mexico courts and then by the Uniform Jury Instructions.
85. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § § 53a-3(12) to -3(14), 53a-5 (1973); IlL. Ann. Stat. ch.
38, § § 4-4 to -6 (1962); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 626.2 (1973); N.Y. Rev. Pen. Laws
§ § 15.05-15.15 (1967); 1971 Or. Laws ch. 743, § § 161.085-161.115; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 302 (Purdon 1973); Tex. Penal Code § § 6.02, 6.03 (1974); Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-3(2) (Supp. 1973).
See S. Kadish & M. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 219, for a discussion of the types of minor
differences between recent criminal code revisions and the Model Penal Code's provisions.
86. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § § 301-303.
87. See generally G. Williams, supra note 3, at 521-27 (mental disease), 568-74 (intoxication); W. LaFave & Scott, supra note 3, at 325-32 (mental disease), 341-47 (intoxication).
88. See generally G. Williams, supra note 3, at 140-54; W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note

3, at 356-69.

Summer 1978]

NEW MEXICO MENS REA DOCTRINES

Intoxication as a Defense
I The Voluntary Intoxication Defense in New Mexico
New Mexico follows the general rule with respect to intoxication
as a defense. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a crime of
general intent, 8 I but it may be a defense to a crime of specific intent
if the intoxication prevented the formation of the requisite specific
intent.9 0 Intoxication may be the result of alcohol or drug consumption.9 1
The availability of intoxication as a defense, therefore, depends
upon the general-specific intent distinction. For example, voluntary
intoxication would not be a defense to the crime of battery which
requires an intentional touching 9 2 It would be a defense, however,
to aggravated battery, which requires the unlawful touching of
another with intent to injure. 9 3 This result would obtain even
though intoxication may negate both an intent to touch and an
intent to injure. Thus, intoxication that in fact negates a required
mental state is or is not a defense simply by reason of the classification of the crime according to the general-specific intent distinction.
II

The Voluntary Intoxication Defense Under the Uniform Jury
Instructions
The New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions-Criminal generally
reflect the existing case law in New Mexico concerning voluntary
intoxication as a defense. Such intoxication is not a defense to a
general intent crime, but it is a defense to a specific intent crime.
Instruction 41.05, which may not be read to the jury, 9 4 is the
instruction that is intended to deny the defense of intoxication in
general intent crimes. Its provisions, however, go beyond the purpose
as stated in the Committee Commentary. Instruction 41.05, by its
89. State v. Tapia, 81 N.M. 274, 466 P.2d 551 (1970) (murder in the second degree);
State v. Scarborough, 55 N.M. 201, 230 P.2d 235 (1951) (rape); State v. Ramirez, 84 N.M.
166, 500 P.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1972) (battery and rape).
90. State v. Lucero, 70 N.M. 268, 372 P.2d 837 (1962) (larceny); State v. Brigance, 31
N.M. 436, 246 P. 897 (1926) (murder in the first degree-willful, deliberate, and premeditated); State v. Cooley, 19 N.M. 91, 140 P. 1111 (1914); State v. Crespin, 86 N.M. 689,
526 P.2d 1282 (Ct. App. 1974) (aggravated battery); State v. Nelson, 83 N.M. 269, 490
P.2d 1242 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 83 N.M. 259, 490 P.2d 1232 (1971) (armed robbery).
Contra, State v. Roybal, 66 N.M. 416, 349 P.2d 332 (1960) (larceny).
91. State v. Nelson, 83 N.M. 269, 490 P.2d 1242 (Ct. App. 1971).
92. State v. Ramirez, 84 N.M. 166, 500 P.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1972).
93. State v. Crespin, 86 N.M. 689, 526 P.2d 1282 (Ct. App. 1974).
94. The Use Note for N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.05 provides, in capital letters: "No Instruction on this subject shall be given." There are a number of instructions in addition to N.M.
U.J.I. Crim. 41.05 that may not be read to the jury.
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terms, prohibits the defense in all crimes, including specific intent
crimes. It provides:
Evidence has been presented that the defendant was intoxicated
from use of [alcohol] [drugs]. An act committed by a person while
voluntarily intoxicated is no less criminal because of his condition. If
the evidence shows that the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated
when allegedly he committed the crime[s] of

that fact is not a defense. (Brackets in original)
The conflict between the terms of instruction 41.05 and the instructions that provide for intoxication as a defense to specific intent
crimes is obviated, fortunately, by the Use Note for instruction
41.05. It states that instruction 41.05 shall not be given to the
jury. 9" According to the Approved Committee Commentary, the
Committee preferred that in general intent crimes no instruction on
intoxication be given rather than giving an instruction that intoxication is no defense. 9 6 An instruction that intoxication is no defense,
it was believed, might be misleading where evidence of intoxication
was admitted on some issue other than intent.
The instructions that afford a defense of intoxication in specific
intent crimes are 41.10 and 41.11. Instruction 41.10 deals specifically with a first degree murder charge and permits voluntary
intoxication to negate a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing
if intoxication rendered the defendant incapable of forming such a
state of mind.9 Instruction 41.11 allows a defense for intoxication in
nonhomicide cases where the effect of intoxication is to prevent the
formation of a specific intent that is required for commission of an
95. Id
96. N.M. U.J.I. Crim., Approved Committee Commentaries 41.05 (1975). The Approved
Committee Commentaries were drafted by the same New Mexico Supreme Court Committee that drafted the Instructions. They are included in the book, New Mexico Uniform
Jury Instructions Criminal (1975).
97, N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.10 provides.
Evidence has been presented that the defendant was [intoxicated from use
of (alcohol) (drugs)] [suffering from a mental disease or disorder]. You must
determine whether or not the defendant was _
and if so,
what effect this had on the defendant's ability to form the deliberate intention
to take away the life of another.
If the defendant was not capable of forming a deliberate intention to take
the life of another, you must find him not guilty of a first degree murder by
deliberate killing. [The deliberate intention to take away the life of another
required for a first degree murder by deliberate killing is not an element of
_ If you find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder
by deliberate killing, you must proceed to determine whether or not he is
guilty of
]
(Brackets in original.)
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offense. 9 8 Both instructions require the jury to determine whether
the defendant was intoxicated from the use of alcohol or drugs and,
if so, to determine what effect the intoxication had on the defendant's ability to form the requisite specific intent. If the effect of the
intoxication is to render the defendant incapable of forming such
intent, the intoxication is a defense to that crime.
If there is a lesser included offense that is not a specific intent
crime, neither 41.10 nor 41.11 provide for complete exculpation.
Thus, if intoxication prevented premeditation and deliberation,
intoxication is a defense to first degree murder but not to second
degree murder because second degree murder is deemed to be a
general intent crime. Indeed, both instructions explicitly provide that
the jury should proceed to consider the issue of guilt or innocence of
any other offense or lesser included offense9 if they find the
defendant not guilty of the specific intent crime charged due to the
effect of intoxication. Although a first degree murder charge will
always include the lesser included offense of second degree murder,
not all nonhomicide specific intent crimes necessarily include lesser
offenses. If such specific intent crimes are charged, instruction 41.11
affords a complete defense.1 00
The way in which the intoxication instruction are structured in
instructions 41.05, 41.10 and 41.11 presents a conflict with the
general intent instruction in 1.50.1 01 Instruction 1.50 must be given
to the jury in every case, and this instruction affords a defense if the
98. N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 41.11 provides:
Evidence has been presented that the defendant was [intoxicated from the
use of (alcohol) (drugs)I [suffering from a mental disease or disorderI. You
must determine whether or not the defendant was
and, if
so, what effect this had on the defendant's ability to form the intent to
If

the

defendant was not capable of forming such intent to
, you must find him not guilty of
[Intent to
is not an element of the crime of
_ If you
find the defendant not guilty of
I
you must proceed to determine whether or not he is guilty of the crime of

.1

(Brackets in original.)
99. A lesser included offense is not defined in N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.11, its Use Note, or
the Approved Committee Commentary. See State v. Reed, 39 N.M. 44, 50, 39 P.2d 1005,
1011 (1934), where a lesser included offense is defined as one that is necessarily included in
the crime charged. In other words, the lesser offense must necessarily be committed if the
greater is committed. For example, robbery is a lesser included offense of armed robbery
and assault is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault.
100. See, e.g., the specific intent crime of larceny. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-16-1 (Supp.
1975). For a discussion of the New Jersey larceny statute, see Thompson & Gagne, The
Confusing Law of Criminal Intent in New Mexico, supra note 43, at 80-81.
101. See note 60 and accompanying text supra for the text of N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 1.50.
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defendant did not act with intent. Although instruction 41.05 states
that intoxication is not a defense, this instruction may not be given
to the jury. It would appear, therefore, that a jury instructed in the
terms of instruction 1.50 could find the defendant not guilty where
intoxication negates general intent. This result may be even more
likely where the crime charged is one of specific intent that includes
a lesser general intent crime. In such a case the jury would be instructed that intoxication is a defense to the specific intent crime if
it rendered the defendant incapable of forming a specific intent
(instruction 41.11). In addition, under instruction 1.50, they would
be instructed that it is a defense to the lesser included general intent
crime if the defendant did not act purposely. Since the jury would
not be instructed that intoxication is not a defense to a general
intent crime, it is not mere speculation to suggest that a jury, instructed according to instructions 1.50 and 41.11, might not comprehend that intoxication is not a defense to a general intent crime. New
Mexico Supreme Court Uniform Jury Instructions Rule Committee,
without considering the relationship between the intoxication instructions and instruction 1.50, assumed that instructions 41.10 and
41.11 would limit the defense of intoxication to specific intent
crimes without the need for a separate instruction concerning the
effect of intoxication on general intent crimes.' 0 2
The Committee's assumption was considered by the New Mexico
where a defendant reCourt of Appeals in State v. Kendall,'
quested an instruction that "would have directed the jury to consider
the effect of intoxication on defendant'a ability to form a general
criminal intent."' 04 The requested instruction was refused, and the
Court of Appeals found no error in the refusal. The court based its
decision on New Mexico case law holding that voluntary intoxication
"is not a defense to the question of whether a defendant had a
general criminal intent."' "s This decision supports the view of the
Committee Commentary that the Uniform Jury Instructions do not
authorize an instruction that intoxication is a defense to a general
intent crime. This decision, however, does not support the Committee's assumption that the new instructions limit the defense of
intoxication to specific intent crimes. The Court of Appeals decided
only that the jury could not be instructed that intoxication is a
102. N.M. U.J.I. Crim., Approved Committee Commentaries 41.05 (1975).
103. 90 N.M. 236, 561 P.2d 935 (Ct. App. 1977) rev'd on other grounds, 90 N.M. 191,
561 P.2d 464 (1977).
104. Id at 240-41, 561 P.2d at 939-40.
105. Id. at 240, 561 P.2d at 939.
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defense to a general intent crime. It did not hold that the jury should
be instructed not to consider the effect of intoxication on the ability
to form a general criminal intent. Thus, the intoxication instructions
and instruction 1.50 are still inconsistent after Kendall; and it is
indeed possible that juries may, without the benefit of an instruction
authorizing it, consider intoxication as a means of negating intent as
defined in instruction 1.50.
Although the Uniform Jury Instructions fairly restate the preexisting law on the defense of intoxication, the doctrine that they
posit is inconsistent with the requirement of mens rea. Intoxication
is not a defense even if it negates general criminal intent, a material
element of every offense in New Mexico that is not of the strict
liability variety. Thus, the Uniform Jury Instructions prohibit a
defense of intoxication where in many cases the effect of intoxication is to disprove one of the elements of the crime.
The limitation of the intoxication defense to specific intent crimes
is based largely on an historical compromise rather than on logic.' 06
In fact, the general-specific intent distinction was born in an attempt
to accommodate two competing interests." 07 On the one hand,
conduct under the influence of intoxication is less blameworthy than
similar conduct that was subject to no such influence. On the other
hand, society is unwilling to excuse all persons who commit crimes
while voluntarily intoxicated, especially when the effect of intoxicating liquor or drugs is to "distort judgment and relax the controls
on aggressive and anti-social impulses."' 08
The general-specific intent dichotomy is ill-suited to properly
accommodate these competing interests.'09 Its distinction is
dependent upon the statutory formulation of a criminal offense, and
legislative wording is hardly a valid basis for determining whether a
particular crime ought to be subject to the defense of intoxication.
Indeed, legislative definition of crimes is most likely made without
regard to the defense of intoxication.
The general-specific intent distinction is irrelevant to the central
question of whether intoxication has prevented the formation of the
required mental state. It likewise fails to take into account situations
106. See I. J.Bishop, Bishop on Criminal Law 299 (9th ed. 1923).
107. See Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1049
(1944).
108. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 458, 462 P.2d 370, 379, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 626-27
(1969).
109. See Young, Rethinking the Specific-General Intent Doctrine in California Criminal
Law, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 1352, 1357-63 (1975) for a critique of the specific-general intent
basis of the intoxication defense.
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in which intoxication ought not to be a defense.' 1 0 These considerations led Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court to abandon the specific-general intent approach to intoxication and to turn
directly to policy considerations.' '' Faced with the question of
whether intoxication may be a defense to the crime of aggravated
assault, Justic Traynor, without deciding whether assault was a crime
of general or specific intent,' 1 2 held that the defense of intoxication
does not apply to an assault. He stated that it would be anomalous to
allow evidence of intoxication to relieve a person of responsibility
for crimes such as assault that are frequently committed by rash and
impulsive acts when the effect of alcohol is to distort judgment and
relax controls on aggressive and anti-social impulses.' I In Justrice
Traynor's view, these policy considerations provided a much sounder
basis for deciding the applicability of the intoxication defense. 1 ' 4
In addition, the general-specific intent basis for the intoxication
defense does not allow for total exculpation in most cases because
most specific intent crimes include a lesser general intent offense.' ' s
The effect of the defense is thus to reduce the degree of the crime.
For example, if a person is so intoxicated that he is unaware of the
nature of the controlled substances that he acquires, the defense of
intoxication is available to the crime of possession with intent to
distribute'1 6 as it is a specific intent crime.' 1 I The anomalous
results of the general-specific intent formula for intoxication is then
vividly illustrated if the same person is charged with intentionally
distributing.' 8 Since this crime is a general intent crime,' 19 the
same unawareness occasioned by intoxication does not afford a
defense. Although the two results illustrated above may be rationalized as the manifestation of a valid policy of mitigation, but not total
exculpation, mitigation ought to be accomplished according to prin110. Id. at 1357-58. See also Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, supra note
107, at 1079-80, 1084.
111. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969).
112. Justice Traynor stated that an assault may be characterized as either a general intent
or a specific intent crime. Id. at 457-58, 462 P.2d at 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
113. Id. at 458, 462 P.2d at 379, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 626-27.
114. The specific-general intent basis for the intoxication defense in California was
revived two years later in People v. Rocha, 3 Cal. 3d 893, 479 P.2d 372, 92 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1971). See Young, Rethinking the Specific- General Intent Doctrine in California Criminal
Law, supra note 109, at 1360-63, for a critique of the Rocha decision.
115. See note 99 supra.
116. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 54-11-20(A)(3) (Supp. 1975).
117. State v. Bender, 91 N.M. 670, 579 P.2d 796 (1978); State v. Gonzales, 86 N.M.
556, 525 P.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1974).
118. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 54-11-20(A)(2), 54-11-20(B) (Supp. 1975).
119. State v. Bender, 91 N.M. 670, 579 P.2d 796 (1978) (overruling State v. Gonzales,
86 N.M. 556, 525 P.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1974).
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ciple rather than according to the statutory formulation of a crime.
Moreover, some specific intent crimes do not have lesser included
general intent crimes. For those offenses, therefore, voluntary intoxication is an exculpatory rather than a mitigating defense.
The New Mexico courts and legislature should reexamine the
defense of intoxication with a view toward revision on a more
principled basis. One such basis is to permit intoxication to be a
defense whenever it is relevant to disprove the required mens rea.1 20
In essence, this view would require no special rule for intoxication;
instead, intoxication would be dealt with under the mens rea
doctrine.
III. The Voluntary Intoxication Defense Under the
Model Penal Code.
Another principled basis is the position taken by the Model Penal
Code. The Code allows intoxication as a defense if it negatives an
element of the offense.' 2" However, when recklessness establishes
an element of the offense, and the defendant, due to intoxication, is
unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been
sober, such unawareness is immaterial.' 2 2 The effect of these provisions of the Model Penal Code is to recognize intoxication as a
mens rea defense in all but two situations: where recklessness or
negligence suffice to establish criminal liability. Thus, intoxication is
a defense if it negates either a purposeful or a knowing state of
mind.' 23 It is not a defense where negligence is a sufficient mens rea
because intoxication cannot logcially negate a negligent mens rea.1 24
A defendant who is unaware of a substantial risk due to intoxication
is negligent because such unawareness is unreasonable when measured by the standard of the ordinary and sober person.' 25
In the case of recklessness, the Model Penal Code creates a special
rule that limits the defense of intoxication when its relevant effect is
to negate recklessness.' 2 6 The rationale for this limitation on the
defense of intoxication is stated in the Comments to the Model Penal
Code.
[TIhere is the fundamental point that awareness of the potential
consequences of excessive drinking on the capacity of human beings
120. See Comments on Model Penal Code § 208, at 6-7 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); G.
Williams, supra note 3, at 573.
121. Model Penal Code § 2.08(1) (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
122. Id at § 2.08(2).
123. Id. at 7-9.
124. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 346.
125. Id
126. Model Penal Code § 2.08(2) (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
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to gauge the risks incident to their conduct is by now so dispersed in
our culture that we believe it fair to postulate a general equivalence
between the risks created by the conduct of the drunken actor and
the risks created by his conduct in becoming drunk. Becoming so
drunk as to destroy temporarily the actor's powers of perception

and of judgment is conduct which plainly has no affirmative social
The actor's moral
value to counterbalance the potential danger.
127
culpability lies in engaging in such conduct.

The principle upon which the Model Penal Code bases its rules on the
defense of intoxication is thus one of culpability. If intoxication
negates culpability by precluding a required mens rea, it is defense.
Intoxication does not negate culpability where recklessness is
involved because the Model Penal Code presumes that the act of
getting drunk establishes a reckless culpability.
One might reasonably question whether the Model Penal Code's
presumption of recklessness in the act of becoming drunk is warranted in all cases. Such a reservation has led to the suggestion that
rather than presume recklessness, a central inquiry should be whether
a person, in the act of becoming drunk, has, in fact, been reckless as
to the risk of dangerous behavior. 1 28 According to this view, normal
persons who commit harms while intoxicated should not be punished
for recklessness unless, before voluntarily becoming intoxicated, they
had such prior experience as to anticipate the condition of intoxication and the possibility of dangerous behavior in that condition.' 2 9
If a person had such prior experience and voluntarily consumed
intoxicating liquor or drugs, then such a person acts recklessly in
becoming intoxicated and is criminally responsible for any results
that are proximately caused.
The three suggested positions regarding intoxication as a defense
merit consideration by the New Mexico courts and the legislature.
All are based on principled choices and are significantly better solutions to the problem of intoxication and crime then the present
doctrine that is carried forward in the New Mexico Jury Instructions.
IV The Involuntary Intoxication Defense
The New Mexico Jury Instructions- Criminal include a defense of
127. Comments on Model Penal Code § 2.08, at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
128. J. Hall, supra note 3, at 552-57. Contra, Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense to
Crime, 1961 U. 111.L.F. 1.
129. J. Hall, supra note 3, at 552-57; Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility,
supra note 107, at 1078-80, 1084.
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involuntary intoxication, although there is no statute or case in New
Mexico recognizing this defense. Instruction 41.06 provides, in
pertinent part:
If the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated and as a result of
such intoxication he
[did not know what he was doing or understand the consequences
of his act] [or]
[did not know that his act was wrong] [or]
[could not prevent himself from committing the act]
then you must find him not guilty.
(Bracketed material in original text.)
The instruction defines intoxication as involuntary if "a person is
forced to become intoxicated against his will," or "a person becomes
intoxicated by using (alcohol) (drugs) without knowing the intoxicating character of the (alcohol) (drugs) and without willingly
assuming the risk of possible intoxication."' ' 30
The involuntary intoxication defense in instruction 41.06 effectively relieves the defendant of criminal responsibility and is
essentially identical to the insanity test set forth in instruction 4 1.00,
the M'Naghten test plus the incapacity to control conduct test.1 3 1
The only difference between 41.06 and 41.00 is the source of
irresponsibility; instruction 4.06 requires involuntary intoxication,
while instruction 41.00 requires a mental disease.
Instruction 41.06 is similar to the involuntary intoxication defense
130. N.M. U.J.l. Crim. 41.06.
131. N.M. U.J.l. Crim. 41.00 provides:
Evidence has been presented concerning the defendant's sanity. In
determining whether or not the defendant was sane, you may consider all the
evidence including [testimony of medical experts] [testimony of lay
witnesses] [acts and conduct of the defendant].
A person is insane if, as a result of a mental disease, he
[did not know what he was doing or understand the consequences of his
act,] [or]
[did not know that his act was wrong,] [or]
[could not prevent himself from committing the act].
If you determine that the defendant committed the act charged but you are
not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane at that time, you
must find him not guilty by reason of insanity. [Even if you find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane, you must still determine if he
had the ability to form the deliberate intention to take away the life of
another.] [Even if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
sane, you must still determine if he had the ability to form an intent to
(Brackets in original.)
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1
found in the Model Penal Code § 2.08(4). 32 Both provisions
include intoxication that occurs when a person is forced to take
drugs against his will. 1 33 New Mexico's instruction 41.06, however,
differs from the Model Penal Code with respect to a second type of

involuntary intoxication. It provides that intoxication is involuntary

if the person either had no knowledge of the intoxicating effect of
the substance he took or did not willingly assume the risk of possible
intoxication.' 14 If willingly assuming the risk requires awareness of
the risk,' s' this defense would be available to a person who negliintoxicating.' 36
gently believed that the substance he took was not
The Model Penal Code, on the other hand, apparently requires that
the person's belief as to the nonintoxicating character of the substance be reasonable.' ' I The Model Penal Code includes a third type
of intoxication in its defense. It provides that pathological intoxication, defined as intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the
amount of the intoxicant, which is caused by an abnormal bodily

condition not known to the actor,' 3 1 is a defense if the effect of

such intoxication establishes the grounds for insanity.1 39 The only
other difference between instruction 41.06 and the Model Penal

Code relates to the use of a different test for insanity.' 40
The defense of involuntary intoxication affects a small percentage
132. Model Penal Code § 2.08(4) (Prop. Official Draft 1962) provides: "Intoxication
which (a) is not self-induced or (b) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of
such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate its criminality (wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law." (Brackets in original.)
133. See the text of N.M. U.J.l. Crim. 41.06 in the text accompanying note 130 supra;
Model Penal Code § 2.08(5)(b) (Prop. Official Draft 1962) defines "self-induced intoxication" as "intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his
body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he
introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a
defense to a charge of crime." Intoxication that is not self-induced is thus any intoxication
that does not meet the definition of self-induced intoxication in § 2.08(5)(b).
134. See the text accompanying note 130 supra.
135. This language seems to mean that recklessness with respect to the intoxicating
effect of a substance will not meet the definition of involuntary intoxication. See Model
Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (Prop. Official Draft 1962) for a workable definition of recklessness.
136. If a person becomes intoxicated who is unaware of the risk of possible intoxication,
he did not willingly assume that risk. Whether that person was negligent in not realizing the
risk is immaterial.
137. If a person "knows or ought to know" the tendency of a substance to cause
intoxication, any resulting intoxication is self-induced. Model Penal Code § 2.08(5)(b)
(Prop. Official Draft 1962).
138. Model Penal Code § 2.08(5)(c) (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
139. Model Penal Code § 2.08(4) uses the same test for exculpation that is used by the
insanity defense in Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
140. Compare the New Mexico insanity test, note 131 supra, and Model Penal Code
§ 4.01 (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
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of intoxication cases.' 4 1 Most cases concerning the effect of intoxication on criminal responsibility arise in the context of voluntary
intoxication. Nevertheless, the defense of involuntary intoxication is
an important limitation on criminal liability, especially where the
defense of voluntary intoxication is limited so that it does not always
measure culpability and responsibility.
Mental Disease or Disorderas a Defense
I. The Mental Disease or DisorderDefense in New Mexico
A mental disease or defect is most commonly a defense if it meets
the requirements of the insanity defense. The insanity defense in
New Mexico is not a mens rea defense;' 4 ' it does not focus on the
mental elements of a crime. Instead, it is concerned with the defendant's understanding of his act and his responsibility for the crime
with which he is charged. Called the M'Naghten rule, the insanity test
in New Mexico requires that a mental disease or defect render the
defendant incapable of comprehending the wrongfulness of his act or
the nature and quality of his act." ' This rule has been extended by
adding to the defense the incapability of preventing oneself from
committing the act.' " Under both parts of the insanity defense in
New Mexico," ' the particular mental elements required for the
commission of a crime are irrelevant.
A mental disease or defect may, however, logically prevent the
formation of the mental state required for commission of a crime.
This possibility exists whether or not the test for insanity is met. The
New Mexico Supreme Court first recognized a mens rea defense for a
mental disease or disorder in State v. Padilla.1 46 The Court held in

that case that a disease of the mind short of legal insanity could
prevent premeditation and deliberation and could be a defense to
first degree murder. Analogizing a mental disorder to intoxication,
the court said, "If alcohol or drugs can legally prevent a person from
truly deliberating, then certainly a disease of the mind, which has the
same effect, should be given like consideration."' '
The New Mexico courts have not extended the mens rea-mental
141. See generally J. Hall,supra note 3, at 538-44.
142. It is not a mens rea defense in the special sense of the term. It is a mens rea defense
in its general sense. See note 7 supra.
143. State v. Moore, 42 N.M. 135, 76 P.2d 19 (1938); State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60
P.2d 646 (1936).
144. State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954).
145. See N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.00 for the Instruction on the insanity defense. The text of
the Instruction is set forth in note 131 supra.
146. 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312 (1959).
147. Id. at 294, 347 P.2d at 315.
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disease defense to second degree murder or to voluntary manslaughter. 1 48 Logically, a mental disease or defect could render the
defendant incapable of forming the requisite mental states for those
offenses.1 49 Intoxication has not been available as a defense for
these homicides either.' ' 0

The use of mental disease as a mens rea defense arose originally in
the context of homicide offenses,' 1 i yet this defense is not limited
to a premeditated and deliberate murder charge. The Padilla opinion
appears to equate a mental disease with intoxication in terms of the
effect on a person's ability to form a specific intent. The Supreme
2 in
Court of New Mexico quoted with approval a Colorado case'
which the Colorado Supreme Court held that evidence of a mental
disease may be introduced to show the absence of a specific intent,
that is, the absence of premeditation or deliberation. The emphasis
on the similarity between a mental condition and intoxication
suggests that, apart from legal insanity, a mental disease is a defense
if it negates a specific intent.' 5 ' Like the intoxication defense, a
148. State v. Chambers, 84 N.M. 309, 502 P.2d 999 (1972); State v. Holden, 85 N.M.
397, 512 P.2d 970 (Ct. App. 1973).
149. See, e.g., People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911,49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966);
People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959). These cases held that "malice
aforethought," the mens rea requirement for murder, may be negated by evidence of an
abnormal mental condition that did not amount to legal insanity. The California Supreme
Court construed malice aforethought to be a separate mental state-the ability to comprehend the duty to govern one's actions in accord with the duty imposed by law. This new
mental state is a specific intent and the ability to achieve this state of mind due to a mental
disease, defect, or intoxication is a defense. See Young, Rethinking the Specific-General
Intent Doctrine in California CriminalLaw, supra note 111, at 1367.
The murder statute in New Mexico also uses the term "malice aforethought" to denote
the mens rea for murder. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-1 (Supp. 1975). New Mexico, like most
jurisdictions, has never defined malice aforethought as a separate state of mind. Instead,
malice aforethought is a label connoting the various states of mind that are sufficient to
make a homicide murder. These states of mind are (1) intent to kill, (2) intent to inflict
grievous bodily harm, (3) gross recklessness (depraved heart type of murder), and (4) the
state of mind associated with the felony under the felony murder doctrine. See generally, W.
LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 528-30; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-1 (Supp. 1975).
Therefore, if an intent to kill is proven, there is malice aforethought in New Mexico. In
California, however, even if there exists an intent to kill, there may not be malice aforethought.
Even with the traditional definition of malice aforethought in New Mexico, it is logically
possible that a mental disease or disorder may prevent the formation of one of the mental
states included within the term "malice aforethought." A mental disease may preclude an
intent to kill or injure, or the awareness of a substantial risk of death.
150. State v. Chambers, 84 N.M. 309, 502 P.2d 999 (1972); State v. Holden, 85 N.M.
397, 512 P.2d 970 (Ct. App. 1973).
151. Id.; State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312 (1959).
152. Battalino v. People, 118 Colo. 587, 199 P.2d 897 (1948).
153. State v. Duran, 80 N.M. 406, 456 P.2d 880 (Ct. App. 1969), implied that a mental
disease could negate the intent required for aggravated assault when it cited State v. Padilla,
66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312 (1959).
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mental disease or defect most likely would not be a defense to a
general intent crime, although there is no case in New Mexico that
has so held.
I.

The Mental Disease or DisorderDefense Under the
Uniform Jury Instruction
The New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions on the use of a mental
disease or disorder as a defense to a criminal prosecution, apart from
insanity, are the same as those for the defense of voluntary intoxication. Under instructions 41. 10 and 41.11, a mental disease or defect
is a defense to a specific intent crime if the mental disease or defect
precludes the formation of the required specific intent. This defense
is often termed the defense of diminished capacity or partial responsibility. '
Instruction 41. 10 is a specialized application of the
defense to the crime of first degree murder by means of a willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing. This instruction provides that if
by reason of a mental disease or disorder "the defendant was not
capable of forming a deliberate intention to take the life of another,
you must" find him not guilty of a first degree murder by deliberate
killing.,"' S Instruction 41.11 permits this defense to operate in nonhomicide cases where the effect of the mental disease or disorder
renders the defendant incapable of forming a required specific intent.' 5 6 Both 41. 10 and 41. 11 provide that the jury, if it determines
that a mental disease or disorder negates a specific intent, should
proceed to ascertain whether the defendant is guilty of any lesser
included offense that does not require a specific intent.' I "
The instructions on mental disease as a defense are inconsistent
with the general intent instruction in the same way as the instructions on voluntary intoxication.' 5 8 Instructions 41.10 and 41.11
limit the defense of mental disease or disorder to those crimes that
require a specific intent. For general intent crimes, instruction 1.50
affords a defense if the defendant did not purposely commit a
criminal act. Neither instruction 1.50 nor instructions 41.10 and
41.11 expressly prohibit a jury from considering the effect of a
mental disease on the defendant's ability to form a general intent. No
instruction attempts to exclude the defense in general intent crimes.
154. See, e.g., W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 325-26; H. Packer, supra note 3, at
135; R. Perkins, supra note 3, at 878-83; G. Williams, supra note 3, at 540-41.
155. See note 97 supra for the text of N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.10.
156. See note 98 supra for the text of N.M. U.J.l. Crim. 41.11.
157. See note 99 supra.
158. See the discussion of the inconsistency between N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 1.50 and the
instructions on intoxication, N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.10 and 41.11, in the text accompanying
notes 101-05 supra
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Since instructions 1.50, 41.10, and 41.11 neither authorize nor
prohibit consideration of the effect of a mental disease or disorder
on the ability to form a general intent, the instructions are ambiguous as to whether such a condition may legally negate intent as
defined in instruction 1.50. This ambiguity is the result of the
Uniform Jury Instruction Committee's assumption that instructions
41. 10 and 41.11 limit the defense of diminished capacity to specific
an assumption that did not take into account the
intent crimes, 1
relationship between these instructions and instruction 1.50.
In attempting to limit this defense to specific intent crimes, the
Uniform Jury Instructions conflict with the mens rea doctrine. This
doctrine affords a defense whenever the mental state required for
commission of an offense is not established. If a mental disease or
defect is relevant to preclude the existence of any required mental
1
element, it is logically a defense. 6 0 Where the presence of a mental
disease or disorder disproves a general criminal intent, however, the
Uniform Jury Instruction deny this defense.
The availability of a mental disease as a mens rea defense under
the Uniform Jury Instructions, therefore, depends upon the generalspecific intent distinction as does the intoxication defense. There is
even less justification for the use of the general-specific intent dis1
tinction with respect to a mental disease or disorder. 6 1 With respect
to intoxication, there arguably are valid policy grounds for limiting
the defense where intoxication was voluntarily self-induced.' 6 2 No
such policy reasons justify a limitation of the diminished capacity
defense where the mental disease or disorder logically tends to prove
that the defendant did not have the state of mind essential for conviction.' 63
By treating the defenses of intoxication and mental disease or
defect in an identical manner, the Uniform Jury Instructions ignore a
critical difference between the two conditions. Intoxication, when
self-induced, may involve some measure of culpability, but a mental
disease or disorder is a condition beyond the defendant's control
159. See note 102 supra.
160. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 325-26; H. Weihofen, Mental Disorder as
a Criminal Defense 176-89 (1954); Weihofen & Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting the
Degree of a Crime, 56 Yale L.J. 959 (1947).
161. See Young, Rethinking the Specific-General Intent Doctrine in California Criminal
Law, supra note 109, at 1375-76, for a discussion of why the defense of diminished capacity
should not be limited to specific intent crimes even if the intoxication is so limited.
162. See note 111-14 supra and accompanying text.
163. See Young, Rethinking the Specific-General Intent Doctrine in California Criminal
Law, supra note 111, at 1372-78, for a critique of People v. Noah, 5 Cal. 3d 469, 487 P.2d
1009, 96 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1971), which denied the defense of diminished capacity for a
general intent crime.
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and, therefore, involves no culpability. While legitimate reasons exist
for limiting the defense of intoxication, there is no justification for
limiting the defense of diminished capacity when a mental disease or
disorder is relevant to preclude mens rea for either a general or
specific intent crime.
III. The Mental Disease or DisorderDefense Under the
Model Penal Code
The New Mexico courts and legislature should rethink the defense
of diminished capacity with a view toward separating it from the
defense of intoxication and removing the specific intent limitation.
Such a position is proposed by the Model Penal Code, § 4.02(1):
"Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or
defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an element of the
offense."' 64 Recognizing no justification for a limitation on this
defense, the Comments by the drafters of the Model Penal Code state
that if states of mind "are accorded legal significance, psychiatric
evidence should be admissible when relevant to prove or disprove
their existence to the same extent as any other relevant evidence."' 6 5 The Model Penal Code treats diminished capacity as a
true mens rea defense; if the presence of the mental disease or defect
precludes the existence of a required mental state, whether a specific
intent or a general intent, it is a defense because there is no culpability.
The Model Penal Code's position that mental disease is a mens rea
defense is a necessary complement to the defense of insanity. The
insanity defense in New Mexico is concerned with the defendant's
overall understanding of and responsibility for the nature, quality, and
wrongfulness of his act, and with his ability to avoid committing that
act.' 6 6 The state of mind required for commission of the offense
may not be relevant to the insanity question. Evidence of a mental
disease or disorder may or may not persuade the trier of fact that the
defendant is not responsible for his act. Nevertheless, the same
evidence may be relevant to disprove the existence of a mental state
that is an essential element of the offense charged. The Model Penal
Code recognizes that evidence of a mental disease or disorder may be
relevant to both issues. In each case, the defendant is not culpable
and, therefore, ought not be subject to the criminal sanction.
164. Model Penal Code § 4.02(1) (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
165. Comments on Model Penal Code § 4.02, at 193 (Tent. Draft 4, 1955).
166. State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954); N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.00.
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Mistake as a Defense
L The Defense of Mistake in New Mexico
No New Mexico case speaks in terms of mistake as a defense.
Several cases, however, recognize mistake as a defense without
denominating their result in those terms. 6 ' Significantly, these
cases approach the problem not in terms of mistake but in terms of
whether the requisite criminal intent can be proven in view of the
mistake.
State v. Craig'68 presents a classic mistake problem. The defendant in that case was charged with selling property he did not own
and had not been given the right to sell. The property that he sold
was a house on land he was purchasing. The house belonged to
someone other than the seller of the land. The defendant claimed he
thought he had the right to sell the house based upon the consent of
the owner and the advice of counsel. He requested an instruction to
the effect that the offense charged required proof that he knew he
had no right to sell the house. This instruction was refused. The
Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed, stating, "We believe that the
statute in question demands the inclusion of intent as an element of
the crime of which appellant was convicted, and that the jury should
have been instructed that criminal intent was an element of the crime
which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt."' 69
Although the defendant and the Supreme Court framed the issue
in terms of the requisite intent for commission of the crime, the
essence of the defense was mistake. His claim that he believed he had
the right to sell the house was essentially a claim of mistake, a
mistake that precludes a criminal intent.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals has taken the same view of
mistake that was suggested by the Supreme Court in Craig. In State
v. Austin,' 70 the court of appeals rejected the defendant's argument
that the offense of unlawfully taking a vehicle might cover a person
who took a vehicle with the mistaken belief that the vehicle was his.
The court of appeals answered defendant's argument not in terms of
mistake but in terms of criminal intent: "Defendant's apprehension
that a person who by mistake or in the honest belief that the car was
167. State v. Craig, 70 N.M. 176, 372 P.2d 128 (1962); State v. Austin, 80 N.M. 748,
461 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1969). These cases are not cited by the N.M. U.J.I. Crim., Approved
Committee Commentaries 41.15 (1975). The Commentaries state that the Committee found
no reported New Mexico cases on this issue.
168. 70 N.M. 176, 372 P.2d 128 (1962).
169. Id. at 181,372 P.2d at 131.
170. 80 N.M. 748, 461 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1969).
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owned by him, took a vehicle without the consent of the owner
might be punished, even though innocent, is unwarranted. Criminal
intent is required."' 7 1
Thus, New Mexico courts have focused on the mens rea requirement rather than on the mistake. Did the defendant possess the
essential criminal intent? A mistake is relevant if it precludes the
requisite intent.
Unlike other jurisdictions, New Mexico courts have made no
distinction between a mistake of fact and a mistake of law.1 72
Either mistake may be a defense if the mistake negates the mens rea
requirement. The mistake claimed by the defendant in Craig is often
termed a mistake of law because the mistake involved defendant's
legal right to sell the house.' ' ' The only mistake that may not be a
defense under the New Mexico view is a mistake as to whether one's
conduct is lawful or not.' 7' Such a mistake, often called ignorance
of the law, does not negate criminal intent. Intent to violate the law,
or knowledge that one is violating the law, is rarely an element of a
crime. This position is consistent with that taken by courts in other
jurisdictions. I'I
It should also be observed that the New Mexico courts have never
required that a mistake be reasonable in order to preclude criminal
intent.' 76 The claim of mistake is addressed in the context of its
effect on the mental states required for commission of any crime. If
the mistake precludes the requisite mens rea, it is a defense; the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the mistake is, presumably,
immaterial if the mistake has that effect. A reasonable mistake
would, of course, negate any criminal intent. An unreasonable mistake would clearly negate a specific intent, and it would logically
preclude both a knowing or a reckless state of mind. An unreasonable mistake as to an element of a crime that may be committed
171. Id. at 750, 461 P.2d at 232.
172. For authorities that have made this distinction see Long v. State, 44 Del. 262, 65
A.2d 489 (1949); R. Perkins, supra note 3, at 935-38; Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in
CriminalLaw, 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 35, 41-46 (1939).
173. See J. Hall, supra note 3, at 392-93 (mistake as to private law); R. Perkins, supra
note 3, at 935-38 (mistake as to nonpenal law); G. Williams, supra note 3, at 287, 305,
327-28 (mistake as to civil law).
174. There is no reported New Mexico decision on this issue. See note 59 and
accompanying text supra for a discussion of this issue under the New Mexico Uniform Jury
Instructions.
175. See J. Hall, supra note 3, at 376-87; W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 362-65;
R. Perkins, supra note 3, at 920-25; G. Williams, supra note 3, at 288.
176. Neither State v. Craig, 70 N.M. 176, 372 P.2d 128 (1962), nor State v. Austin, 80
N.M. 748, 461 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1969), imposed a requirement of reasonableness or even
alluded to it.
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negligently would be no defense, since an unreasonable mistake
would establish the requisite negligence.
II. The Defense of Mistake Under the Uniform Jury Instructions
A. The Distinction Between Reasonable and Unreasonable
Mistakes
The New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions on mistake as a
defense change the pre-existing law in several major respects. The
most significant change is the adoption of an objective standard for
mistakes of fact. Only reasonable mistakes of fact afford a defense.
Instruction 41.15 provides:
Evidence has been presented that the defendant believed that
_

If the defendant [acted] [omitted to act]

under an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of those facts,
you must find him not guilty. The burden is on the State to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act under
such belief. (Brackets in original.)

According to the New Mexico Supreme Court Uniform Jury
Instructions Criminal Rules Committee,1 77 this instruction was
derived from California Jury Instructions'18 because no reported
New Mexico decision on mistake of fact was found. However, two
New Mexico cases recognize mistake as a defense, and neither
imposes a requirement that the mistake be reasonable.' 79 The decisions focus on the effect of the mistake. If the mistake, reasonable or
unreasonable, negates criminal intent, apparently it would be a
defense.
The New Mexico case law approach is essentially that used by the
Model Penal Code.1 80 This approach recognizes that mistake is
relevent only if it has an effect on the required mens rea. An unreasonable mistake is a defense whenever its effect is to negate a
requisite mental state. An unreasonable mistake logically may preclude the existence of any subjective state of mind required for
177. N.M. U.J.I. Crim., Approved Committee Commentaries 41.15 (1975).
178. CALJIC § 4.35 (3d. rev. ed. 1970).
179. State v. Craig, 70 N.M. 176, 372 P.2d 128 (1962); State v. Austin, 80 N.M. 748,
461 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1969).
180. Model Penal Code § 2.04(1) (Prop. Official Draft 1962) provides:
(1) Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if:
(a) The ignorance or mistake negative the purpose, knowledge, belief,
recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the
offense; or
(b) The law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.
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commission of a crime.' a' The words purposely, knowingly, and
recklessly are used in the Model Penal Code to describe these states of
mind.' 82 Negligent culpability, on the other hand, uses the objective
standard of a reasonable person.' "3 An unreasonable mistake establishes, rather than negates, a requirement of negligence. A reasonable
mistake logically negates the four types of culpability recognized by
the Model Penal Code. It precludes negligence and all of the higher
degrees of culpability.
By requiring that all mistakes be reasonable, New Mexico's instruction 41.15 is inconsistent with the pre-existing mistake doctrine in
New Mexico.' I

'

This instruction treats mistake as if it were a

defense apart from its effect on the mens rea requirement. In fact,
the instruction makes no reference to criminal intent, and there is no
requirement that the mistake negate criminal intent. 1 8 s By requiring
that all mistakes be reasonable, instruction 41.15 by implication
imposes a negligent mens rea for all crimes, be they specific intent or
general intent.
Instruction 41.15 is also inconsistent with the definition of general
criminal intent as it appears in instruction 1.50: "purposely [doing]
an act which the law declares to be a crime." If criminal intent, as
defined in that instruction, excludes negligence as a type of culpability, 1 8 6 only subjective states of mind -purposeful, knowing, or
reckless-will suffice to establish criminal liability. These mental
states cannot co-exist with a mistake as to a material element, even if
the mistake is unreasonable. It is inconsistent to tell the jury that
they may not convict unless the defendant acted purposely and then
to tell them that a mistake is a defense only if it is reasonable.
When instruction 41.15 is used as a defense to a crime of specific
181. See Comments on Model Penal Code § 2.04(1), at 136 (Tent. Draft 4, 1955).
182. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a)-(c) (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
183. Id. at § 2.02(2)(d).
184. See note 176 supra and accompanying text.
185. But see State v. Fuentes, 91 N.M. 554, 577 P.2d 452, 455 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
91 N.M. 610, 577 P.2d 1256 (1978), where Judge Wood said that the "mistake of fact
instruction is just another way of saying that a defendant cannot be convicted when he does
not have the mental state required for commission of the offense charged."
If the crime does not require criminal intent, mistake of fact is not a defense. Id.
186. Thompson & Gagne, The Confusing Law of Criminal Intent in New Mexico, supra
note 43, at 65-66, in which crimes of criminal intent are said to be different from negligent
crimes and negligent crimes are said to have no element of intent. This is not accurate since
so-called negligent crimes such as involuntary manslaughter do require criminal intent. That
crime requires that the act causing death be done purposely although the defendant was
negligent with respect to the risk of death. See N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 1.50 (1975); see also W.
LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 193-94. There is no New Mexico case known to the
author that states that a negligent crime is not a general intent offense. For possible interpretations of N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 1.50, see notes 66-71 and accompanying textsupra.
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intent, it is even more troublesome. It is possible that a mistake may
negate a specific intent but at the same time be unreasonable.1 87
For example, a person may take another's briefcase under the mistaken belief that it is his. Even if the ordinary and prudent person
would have looked inside to satisfy himself that the briefcase was
indeed his, the mistake would still negate the required intent to
deprive the owner permanently of the briefcase. Under the instruction for larceny in New Mexico instruction 16.00, the jury would be
told that the defendant could be convicted only if the state proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended permanently
to deprive the owner of the briefcase; and, under instruction 41.15,
the jury would be instructed that the mistake as to ownership of the
briefcase must be reasonable.
The inconsistency between instruction 41.15 and the intent instructions could easily be avoided by redrafting the mistake instruction to reflect prior New Mexico law. The new instruction would
simply provide that a mistake is a defense if it negates the required
mens rea. Since such an instruction refers to the mens rea requirement, it is important that the mental state or states required for
commission of a crime be defined with particularity. Concepts such
as general criminal intent should be abandoned, and the Model Penal
Code's approach to mens rea should be adopted.
B. The DistinctionBetween Mistake of Fact and Law
The second major change brought about by the new Uniform Jury
Instructions on mistake is the limitation of the defense to mistakes
of fact. Instruction 41.15 is entitled "Ignorance or Mistake of Fact,"
and the terms of the defense refer only to "facts." If instruction
41.15 is interpreted to exclude mistakes as to legal matters as a
defense, the Uniform Jury Instructions depart from prior New
Mexico decisions on mistake. These decisions made no distinction
between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law as long as the effect of
the mistake was to negate criminal intent." 88
It is important to determine whether a mistake as to a legal
circumstance is one of fact or law.1 8 9 Suppose that a person believes
that he is not married because he mistakenly believes that his recent
divorce is valid. 1 90 This may be termed a mistake of fact because the
187. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 140-41, 201-05; R. Perkins, supra note
3, at 940-43.
188. State v. Craig, 70 N.M. 176, 372 P.2d 128 (1962); State v. Austin, 80 N.M. 748,
461 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1969).
189. See G. Williams, supra note 3, at 287.
190. For a discussion of the bigamy cases involving this claim, see J. Hall, supra note 3,
at 395-401; W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 358-59; R. Perkins, supra note 3, at
944-48; G. Williams, supra note 3, at 176-83.
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mistake concerns a fact-whether one is married. It may be considered a mistake of law in the sense that the mistake involves a legal
question-whether the divorce is legally valid. If such a mistake is one
of fact, under instruction 41.15 it is a defense if reasonable. If it is
deemed to be a mistake of law, it is not a defense even if reasonable.
The ambiguity in instruction 41.15 with respect to what is a
mistake of fact was avoided by the prior New Mexico approach and
by the Model Penal Code. Under the New Mexico approach, no such
ambiguity arose because no distinction was made between mistakes
of fact and law. The only inquiry concerned the effect of the
mistake. If the mistake, however denominated, precluded criminal
intent, it was a defense. The Model Penal Code avoids the problem
by specifically providing that either a mistake of fact or law is a
defense if it negates a state of mind required for commission of an
offense.'

91

III. Ignorance of the Law Doctrine Under the Uniform Jury
Instructions
Where the mistaken belief has no effect on the mens rea requirements of the crime charged, the New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions-Criminal reflect the traditional position that such a mistake is
not a defense. 1 92 This doctrine of ignorantia legis non excusat is
embodied in instruction 41.16:
Evidence has been presented that the defendant was [ignorant of]
[mistaken about] the law which he is accused of violating. When a
person voluntarily does that which the law forbids and declares to be
a crime, it is no defense that he did not know that his act was
unlawful or that he believed it to be lawful.
(Brackets in original.)

Since instruction 41.16 may not be given to the jury,' 93 the only
instruction that precludes a defense for this type of mistake is instruction 1.50. It provides in pertinent part: "A person acts
intentionally when he purposely does an act which the law declares
to be a crime, even though he may not know that his act is unlawful. " [Emphasis added.]
The type of mistake to which instructions 41.16 and 1.50 pertain
is very different from the mistake considered earlier. This mistake
does not concern an element of the crime with which a person is
charged; instead, it concerns the very law with which he is
charged. 1 9 In this type of mistake, the defendant claims that he
191.
192.
193.
194.

Model Penal Code § 2.04(1) (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
See note 175 supra.
Use Note for N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.16.
See the authorities cited in note 173 supra concerning the two types of mistake.
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erroneously believed that his conduct was lawful either because he
was ignorant of the law or believed that the law did not cover his
conduct. A defendant who claimed that he did not know it was
against the law to have multiple spouses would be raising this type of
mistake. This is a substantially different mistake than the one where
the defendant erroneously believed that he was married to only one
spouse following an invalid divorce. In the former example, the
mistake has no effect on the actus reus or mens rea elements of the
crime of bigamy. The latter mistake may logically negate the mens
rea requirement of the offense-that the defendant not be married at
the time that he takes a spouse.
The difference in the two types of mistakes can be illustrated best
by means of a diagram. Consider the effect of each mistake,
supposing that the crime of -bigamy is composed of the following
elements:
Bigamy
Actus Reus
(1) Act of marrying
(2) Another
(3) While married

Mens Rea

Purposeful, knowing,
reckless, negligent

The claim that one did not know it was against the law to have several
spouses does not disprove any element of the actus reus or mens rea.
The claim that one believed he was not married at the time he
married another may negate a purposeful, knowing, reckless, or even
negligent state of mind.
Although instruction 41.16 and 1.50 follow the traditional
doctrine that ignorance of the law is no excuse, no reported New
Mexico cases deal with this second type of mistake of law. Although
this doctrine has been justified as necessary for a workable system of
criminal justice,' ' it has been questioned on the ground that it is
inconsistent with the premise of criminal law that requires culpability in order to impose criminal liability.' 96 A number of exceptions
to this doctrine have been recognized,' 9 and it has been proposed
195. See J. Hall, supra note 3, at 382-87; W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 363-64;
R. Perkins, supra note 3, at 924-25; G. Williams, supra note 3, at 289-93.
196. See, e.g., W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 364; H. Packer, supra note 3, at
129; G. Williams, supra note 3, at 288; Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 Minn. L.
Rev. 1043, 1060 (1958); Ryu & Silving, Error Juris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 421, 467 (1957).
197. See, e.g., W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 3, at 365-69; R. Perkins, supra note 3,
at 925-29; J. Hall, supra note 3, at 389-92; G. Williams, supra note 3, at 293-304.
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that ignorance or mistake of law ought to be a defense if the mistake
or ignorance is not culpable.' 98 This latter proposal would replace
the ignorance of law doctrine with a new precept, that is, no person
may be convicted of any crime who, at the time of his act, was
unaware that his actions were criminal, unless his unawareness is
blameworthy, i.e., reckless or negligent.' 9
The Model Penal Code follows the traditional doctrine that ignorance of the law is no excuse. 2 00 It recognizes, however, two limited
exceptions.2 01 If a person is unaware that his conduct constitutes a
crime because the penal law has not been published or otherwise
reasonably made available prior to his conduct, the Model Penal
Code provides a defense. 2 0 2 In addition, if a person's belief that his
conduct is lawful is due to reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, later determined to be invalid or erroneous, he has a
defense. 2 03 The official statement of the law must, however, be
contained in either a statute, a judicial pronouncement, an administrative order, or an official interpretation by the public officer or
body responsible for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the offense. 2 04
With respect to the Model Penal Code's defense that the law is not
published or otherwise reasonably available, it is not clear how broad
the defense is intended to be. The defense states that the statute
must be unknown to the defendant. 2
If this provision is read to
establish a negligence standard for the defendant's ignorance, the
198. See, e.g., The German Penal Code § 17 (1969) (cited in S. Kadish & M. Paulsen,
supra note 7, at 124); Hughes, CriminalOmissions, 67 Yale L.J. 590,615-16 (1958);Mueller,
On Common Law Mens Reasupra note 196, at 1060; Ryn & Silving, Error Juris: A
Comparative Study, supra note 196, at 467; Note, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 Win. & Mary 671 (1977); Note, Mistake and Ignorance in Criminal Cases, 39
Mod. L. Rev. 644 (1977).
199. Note, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, supra note 198, at 684-89;
Note, Mistake and Ignorance in Criminal Cases, supra note 198, at 652-53.
200. Model Penal Code § 2.02(9) (Prop. Official Draft 1962). This provision does not
speak in terms of the traditional doctrine but, instead, provides that "[nI either knowledge
nor recklessness or negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the
existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of an offense is an
element of such offense, unless the definition of the offense or the Code so provides." The
Model Penal Code chose this formulation in order to avoid the overstatement of the principle that ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse. See Comments on Model Penal Code
§ 2.02(9) at 131 (Tent. Draft 4, 1955).
201. Model Penal Code § 2.04(3) (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
202. Id at § 2.04(3)(a).
203. Id. at § 2.04(3)(b).
204. Id
205. Id. at § 204(3)(a).
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Model Penal Code would in effect abolish the rigidity of the ignorantia legis maxim."'
The breadth of the Model Penal Code's defense for reasonable
reliance upon an official statement of the law is also unclear.
Suppose for example that there is no official statement of the law
but that the defendant reasonably believes a superior who informs
him that such an official statement exists. Would this reasonable
belief establish a defense under the Model Penal Code? If an official
statement of the law is not required, and a reasonable belief that
there is such a statement will suffice to invoke this defense, this
proposal would go a long way toward eroding the traditional
doctrine that ignorance is no excuse. 2 I
A related problem concerns the official interpretation provision of
the reasonable reliance defense.2 08 Is a defendant entitled to rely on
this defense (1) if an interpretation is not official but he reasonably
believes that it is, or (2) if the officer giving the interpretation is not
charged by law with the responsibility for the interpretation,
administration or enforcement of the law but the defendant reasonably believes tha the officer is? 2 0 9 If a defense is available in the
above situations, the Model Penal Code's exceptions leave little of
the general rule 2 1 0 and go quite far in making only nonculpable
ignorance a defense.
CONCLUSION
The New Mexico approach to mens rea issues as set forth in the
New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions-Criminal is in need of
reform. The instruction on criminal intent does not adequately
define the mental state or states required for commission of a crime;
and the instructions on intoxication, mental disease, and mistake are
in part inconsistent with the instruction on criminal intent and with
the requirement of culpability. In addition, the instructions retain
206. See H. Packer, supra note 3, at 129. The Comments on § 2.04(3)(a) of the Model
Penal Code do not address this issue and do not give any guidance as to the interpretation of
the provision. Model Penal Code § 2.04(3)(a) (Tent. Draft 4, 1955).
207. This interpretation of Model Penal Code § 2.04(3)(b) (Prop. Official Draft 1962) is
quite similar to the defense raised and rejected by the defendants in United States v. Barker,
546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Note, Reliance on Apparent Authority as a Defense
to CriminalProsecution, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 775 (1977).
The Comments on Model Penal Code § 2.04(3)(b) do not address these issues and do not
provide any guidance as to how they would be resolved. (Tent. Draft 4, 1955).
208. Model Penal Code § 2.04(3)(b)(iv) (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
209. See note 207 supra.
210. For example, the defense of ignorance based upon reasonable reliance upon advice
of an attorney would not be recognized by the Model Penal Code. See W. LaFave & A. Scott,
supra note 3, at 368-69, for a discussion of this exception to the ignorantialegis doctrine.
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the specific-general intent distinction-a distinction that serves no
purpose and only causes confusion and needless litigation.
The New Mexico legislature should, like a growing number of
other jurisdictions, seriously consider a comprehensive revision of the
New Mexico Criminal Code to reflect the Model Penal Code's approach to mens rea issues. The Model Penal Code's provisions on
culpability represent a modem and coherent treatment of mens rea
problems. Its definitions of the four types of culpability, its analytic
framework for resolving mens rea questions, and its formulations of
the defenses for intoxication, mental disease, and mistake all offer
significant improvement over the current New Mexico doctrines as
reflected in the New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions-Criminal. It
is time that New Mexico give up outdated doctrines and adopt a
modem and superior approach to issues of culpability.

